

Lecture 4.

Employment and labor market inequalities

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Labor market are not frictionless

- Perfect labor markets
 - Perfect information; No transaction costs; No regulation
 - Consequences
 - Wage variable as the only variable adjusting market equilibria
 - No unemployment
 - Perfect match skill/jobs
- Real labor markets
 - Unemployment
 - Transaction costs
 - Mismatch Skills/Jobs
 - Job search

Consequence on inequalities

- Labor markets are not just a skill-wage match
- Employment matters
 - Access to employment
 - Role of social capital
 - Structure of employment
 - Segmentation of labor markets
 - Stability of employment
 - Instability of labor market
 - Segregation of employment
 - Externalities

Getting a job: Weak ties convey more information Granovetter (1973)




FIG. 1.—Forbidden triad




FIG. 2.—Local bridges. a, Degree 3; b, Degree 13. ——— = strong tie; - - - - = weak tie.

Original support for weak ties is weak

- A loose proof:
 - “I have used the following categories for frequency of contact: often = at least twice a week; occasionally = more than once a year but less than twice a week; rarely once a year or less. Of those finding a job through contacts, 16.7% reported that they saw their contact often at the time, 55.6% said occasionally, and 27.8% rarely (N=54). The skew is clearly to the weak end of the continuum, suggesting the primacy of structure over motivation.” (1973)
- A stylized fact: work ties
 - 31% of the contacts coded “family-social” and 69% work relations, among which we find 21% of former teachers, 36% of former employers or supervisors, and 33% of former colleagues (1974, p. 46) .
 - “In many cases, the contact was someone only marginally included in the current network of contacts, such as an old college friend or a former workmate or employer, with whom sporadic contact had been maintained (Granovetter 1970, pp. 76-80). Usually such ties had not even been very strong when first forged. For work-related ties, respondents almost invariably said that they never saw the person in a nonwork context” (1973)

Weak ties are higher up in the hierarchy

- Lin, Ensel, Vaughn, 1981, “Social Resources and Strength of Ties: Structural Factors in Occupational Status Attainment”, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Aug., 1981), pp. 393-405
- Mobilizing powerful ties → ties higher up in the hierarchy
- Tie is more likely to be weak






Figure 3. Relations Between the Status of Origin and the Contact Status Through Weak and Strong Ties (Shaded area indicates significant statistical differences.)

But they are more effective because high



E = Ego's original status.
 C, C' = Status of the contact.
 D, D' = Status of the destination.


Figure 1. The Use of Social Resources in a Hierarchical Social Structure



$$R^2_W = .417$$

a. First Job

S_{TW} = Strength of Tie
 O_{TW} = Contact Status
 W = Attained Status



$$R^2_Y = .473$$

b. Current Job

S_{TY} = Strength of Tie
 O_{TY} = Contact Status
 Y = Attained Status

Recruitment at EHESS (Godechot, 2016)

Applications whose PhD advisor is:	1	2	3	4	5	6
Randomly drawn member of the EC	0.137** (0.062)	0.129* (0.066)	0.187*** (0.068)	0.220** (0.085)	0.215** (0.091)	0.139 (0.104)
Ex-officio member of the EC	0.056 (0.076)	0.019 (0.072)	0.050 (0.081)	-0.002 (0.107)	0.029 (0.089)	0.137 (0.189)
Member of EHESS	0.040 (0.029)	0.051* (0.027)	0.021 (0.030)	0.014 (0.035)	0.015 (0.036)	0.035 (0.055)
Competitive exam fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Field	All competitive exams	All competitive exams	All experimental exams	All experimental exams with composition	Assist. Pr. experimental exams	Professor experimental exams
Number of applications [n1 ; n2]	2209 [357; 62]	2209 [357; 62]	991 [184; 55]	749 [143 ; 42]	563 [131; 33]	428 [53; 22]

- Experimental framework: part of EHESS's electoral commission is randomly drawn. 2209 applications (1961-2005), 146 exams, social sciences only.
 - Treatment: the contact is randomly drawn in the electoral commission
 - Control: the contact, although eligible, is not drawn in the electoral commission
 - Treatment's causal effect: treatment effect – control effect

Recruitment in Spanish Academia

(Zinovyeva, Bagues, 2015)

Table A1: The role of connections, by type of connection

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	Means			The effect of connections on candidates' success			Pre-exam quality of promoted candidates			Post-exam quality of promoted candidates		
	All	FP	AP	All	FP	AP	All	FP	AP	All	FP	AP
Strong connection:												
- PhD advisor	3	3	3	0.141*** (0.014)	0.098*** (0.020)	0.173*** (0.019)	-0.186*** (0.065)	-0.190 (0.128)	-0.156** (0.074)	-0.074 (0.073)	0.015 (0.153)	-0.102 (0.080)
- Co-author	8	10	6	0.065*** (0.009)	0.077*** (0.011)	0.051*** (0.013)	-0.005 (0.051)	-0.036 (0.069)	-0.015 (0.075)	-0.100* (0.052)	-0.009 (0.073)	-0.206*** (0.073)
Institutional connection:												
- Same university	26	28	25	0.040*** (0.004)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.041*** (0.006)	-0.065** (0.030)	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.069* (0.038)	-0.090*** (0.033)	-0.062 (0.049)	-0.115** (0.044)
Weak tie:												
- PhD thesis committee member	7	9	5	0.029*** (0.008)	0.021** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.002 (0.059)	-0.039 (0.086)	0.032 (0.081)	0.130** (0.060)	0.100 (0.085)	0.148* (0.084)
- Link by invitation	4	8	0.5	0.043*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.020 (0.046)	0.015 (0.076)	-0.057 (0.071)	0.427 (0.324)	0.002 (0.070)	-0.062 (0.068)	0.564** (0.281)
- Same PhD thesis committee	10	21	2	0.009 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.046* (0.025)	0.049 (0.054)	0.010 (0.055)	0.326* (0.172)	0.069 (0.050)	0.025 (0.053)	0.440*** (0.146)
Indirect tie:												
- Same PhD advisor	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.048 (0.046)	0.089 (0.086)	0.023 (0.053)	-0.338 (0.334)	-1.291*** (0.346)	0.286 (0.479)	-0.456* (0.271)	-0.673 (0.426)	-0.331 (0.393)
- Same co-author	14	12	15	-0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.052)	-0.096 (0.088)	0.035 (0.065)	-0.068 (0.052)	-0.143 (0.103)	-0.032 (0.060)
- Same PhD thesis committee member	8	8	9	0.001 (0.007)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.084 (0.054)	0.040 (0.101)	0.088 (0.063)	0.086 (0.056)	0.210** (0.104)	0.032 (0.065)
Constant				0.113*** (0.002)	0.106*** (0.003)	0.118*** (0.003)	0.419*** (0.018)	0.525*** (0.027)	0.347*** (0.023)	0.457*** (0.017)	0.484*** (0.026)	0.436*** (0.022)
Adjusted R-squared				0.012	0.012	0.013	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.012
Number of observations				31750	13612	18138	3573	1446	2127	3573	1446	2127

Notes: Columns 1-3 provide information on the means of the corresponding variables. Columns 4-12 report OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by exam are reported in parentheses. Columns 4-6 provide information from an analysis similar to the one reported in Table 5. Columns 7-12 replicate the analysis in Table 8. * - p-value<0.10, ** - p-value<0.05, *** - p-value<0.01.

Further work


- Getting a job.
 - Emphasis on information (Burt, 1992 ; Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004)
 - Mixed results (Bridges and Villemez, 1986, Mouw, 2003)
 - Strong ties may count also. Support argument (Bian, 1997; Yakubovich, 2005)
- Strong and weak ties arguments => considering the contact as indifferent to the place where ego finds a job.
- Collaboration ties as a solution (Godechot, 2014)

Labor market segmentation

- Balkanization of labor markets (Kerr, 1955)
 - Strong social closure between different labor markets (structured around firms/occupation/sectors)
 - Internal progress. Little lateral transfers between markets
 - Promotions governed by vacancy chains (White, 1970; Chase, 1991)
- Dualization of labor markets. Doeringer and Piore (1970)
 - Primary segment. Stable and protected jobs. Good working conditions.
 - Male. White
 - Secondary segment. Unstable jobs. Bad working conditions..
 - Female. Minorities
 - Exploitation of secondary segment by primary segment

Social gradient. Unemployment and instability

- Long concentrated (1960s, 1970s)
 - Among secondary segment: working class, young, female, migrant, unskilled level
- Then male breadwinner worker subjected to increased instability
- Followed by middle class



Text

Activation of labor markets

- From life employment
- To boundaryless careers (Arthur 1994)
- Different societal models
 - Incumbent labor markets. Strong dualization between protected and unprotected (Italy, France)
 - Flexsecurity: sharing of instability (Denmark)
- Orient policy reforms
 - Germany Minijobs. France: Loi Travail, etc.

Workplace Fissuring (Weil, 2014)

- **Dediversification** (Zuckerman, 1999; Dobbin & Jung, 2015, Davis, 2016).
- Asymmetric **downsizing** and cost-cutting (Goldstein 2012)
- **Outsourcing** of non-core services (Goldschmidt and Schmieder 2017)
- **Subcontracting** with new forms of buyer power buyer power exploitation (Wilmers, 2018)
- **Franchising** (Weil, 2014)
- In a nutshell : size decrease (Davis 2016) with workplace fissuring (Weil, 2014)

The Great Separation
Top Earner Segregation at Work in
Advanced Capitalist Economies

Working on segregation at work

- *“Workplaces are places where workers work together”*
 - Class and/or social cohesion (Marx 1852, Durkheim 1893)
 - But social cohesion, mostly approached with neighborhood, school segregation
- 2 + 1 reasons to study workplace segregation
 - Redistribution through top down contacts (Chetty et al. 2022)
 - Contact hypothesis (“humanization” of others - Allport 1954)
 - + “Relationality”: workplaces as sites of competing labor claims (Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt 2019)



Contribution 1. Describing a trend

- Earnings segregation studied with **standardized measures of exposure** based on earnings fractiles
 - In contrast to AKM
 - Independent from evolution of wage inequality
 - Showing the heterogeneity of segregation process
 - Comparisons
 - between countries
 - with other forms of segregation
- **Administrative data on 12 countries** representing a diversity of political economies
 - America : **Canada** (Liberal)
 - West Europe:
 - **Norway, Sweden, Denmark** (Social democratic)
 - **France, Germany, Netherlands** (Corporatist)
 - **Spain** (Southern Europe Economy)
 - East Europe: **Hungary, Czechia** (Transitioning)
 - Asia: **Japan, South Korea** (East-Asian capitalism)

Contribution 1. A new stylized fact

- Between workplace earnings segregation increases
- In all countries
- Happens mainly at the top
- Robust to alternative specification
- Stronger trend than along other dimensions (nativity, gender, age..)

Contribution 2. Its socio-economic factors

- A first evaluation of socio-economic factors
 - ! Factors very intertwined and difficult to disentangle (Independent/Mediator)
- Geographical re-composition: small impact
- **Sectoral re-composition**: strong impact,
 - notably **deindustrialization**
- **Workplace shrinking** favors top earner concentration
 - Notably through **restructuring events** such as outsourcing, layoffs, offshoring and subcontracting
- Available indicators show a substantial impact of **digitalization**
- Opens a research agenda on the causes and consequences of workplace segregation

Data and methods

Data

$n = 1,164,687,821$

Data


Country	Start	End	Field	Definition of marginal job threshold	Threshold earning (end year)	Number of workers in establishments size>1 (end year)	Number of establishments (end year)	Number of firms (end year)	Source
Canada	1990	2019	Exhaustive	1/2 full time full year minimum wage	8,921 Can \$	15,571,107	697,953*	686,598	Statistics Canada
Denmark	1994	2018	Exhaustive	1/4 average yearly wage [#]	109,412 Da. Kr	2,039,139	117,700	83,382	RAS, IDAN and BES
Norway	1996	2018	Exhaustive	1/4 average yearly wage [#]	139,875 No. Kr	1,410,206	111,453	72,670	Statistics Norway
Sweden	1990	2018	Exhaustive	1/3 prime age P50	93,210 Sw. Kr	4,049,300	242,806	172,758	Statistics Sweden
France	1993	2019	Exhaustive private and partial public sectors	1/2 full time full year minimum wage	8,024 €	14,328,590	939,634	718,333	DADS
Netherlands	2006	2018	Exhaustive	1/2 Age-specific minimum hourly wage	4 € per hour	10,493,473	295,697	291,270	CBS
Germany	1999	2015	Sample of workers (6%) in 20,000 establishments	1/2 full time P10	12,119 €	1,119,590	9,713	<i>Missing</i>	IEBS
Spain	2006	2018	Random sample of workers (4%)	1/2 full time full year minimum wage	5,837 €	239,159	48,769	40,869	Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH) and tax records
Czechia	2002	2016	Sample of workers (80%)	1/2 full time full year minimum wage	52,830 Cz. Kr	1,917,812	27,667	16,602	Average Earnings Information System (ISPV) survey
Hungary	2003	2017	Sample of workers (50%)	1/2 full time yearly minimum wage	765,000 HUF	1,017,665	90,131*	79,254	Admin2 and Admin3
South Korea	1990	2012	Sample of workers (8%) out of a sample of private sector establishments size>5	1/2 full time full year minimum wage	4,763,200 KRW	613,369	17,327	<i>Missing</i>	Wage Structure Survey
Japan	1990	2013	Sample of workers (4%) out of a sample of private sector establishments size >5	1/2 full time P10	1,056,700 Yen	994,687	56,277	<i>Missing</i>	Basic Survey of Wage Structure

Segregation measures

- We use classical exposure measures with groups based on national wage fractile
 - *Exposure of group g to group h* : For workers of group g, it's the share of their coworkers belonging to group h

$${}_gP_h = \sum_i \left(\frac{n_{gi}}{n_g} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{n_{hi} - 1_{h=g}}{n_i - 1} \right)$$

- Drop one rule : an individual is not exposed to itself (Dell, 1954; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2008)



Top earners growing isolation

A growing endogamy at work at the top


- Growing top1% isolation

- Average 9.2 to 12.3% (log-odds linear trend: 1.4% / year)

Especially in France (+3.0% / year), followed by Czechia, Hungary (+2.2%), and Denmark (+2%)


- Sample countries more bumpy

- No clear trends for Japan, Korea and negative trend for Germany
 - Robustness issue



A growing endogamy at work at the top (2)

- Similar trend for top 10% isolation
 - Average 27.8 to 33.9% (linear trend: +1.1%).
 - More homogeneous: between +0.7% and +2% / year
 - More robust/reliable for countries with samples
 - Japan : +1.5%
 - Korea : +1.9%
- Result 1. Top earners isolate in all countries



A growing separation from bottom workers

- Global decline in exposure of top 1% to bottom 25%.

- Adjusted mean: 1991: 9.3% to 6.9% (-1.6% yearly rate)


- Strong declines

- France, -4.0% year;

- Germany, -4.5%;


- Sweden -2.4%;

- No Decline: Japan and Korea




A growing separation from bottom workers (2)

- Similar trend for top 10% exposure to bottom 25%.
 - Milder and more robust evolution (1.1% yearly rate)
 - Milder than top 1% trends in countries with population data
 - A few country with no significant trends: Hungary, Canada and Japan
- Result 2. In almost all countries, top earners separate from bottom earners.
- Result 3. In most countries, they separate more from bottom earners than from the rest of hierarchy




Do we have a similar polarization at the bottom?

- Countries with no polarization at the bottom:
 - 47.4 to 49.2% (+0.4% yearly rate)
 - Canada, France, Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Japan, South Korea <+0.3%/y.
- Countries with polarization at the bottom:
 - Czechia (+1.6%/y), Denmark and South Korea (+0.8%).
- **Result 4. In a majority of countries, bottom earners' isolation increases less than top earners' isolation.**



To summarize

D10 rate of isolation is the most pronounced



Factors of segregation at work

Strategy for uncovering factors of top earners isolation

- 1. Reduction of the linear trend parameter with regions, industries, & workplaces FE (in 8 to 10 countries)
- 2. Explorations of the regional and industrial categories in which trends are more pronounced (in 10 to 11 countries)
- 3. Analyze within workplace reorganization change
 - Size matters (in 10 countries)
 - Outsourcing, layoffs, offshoring and subcontracting, (in France)
- 4. Cross country regressions
 - Less precise
 - But address the spillover effect

1. Trend decomposition

- Model

$$Isol_{it10} = year + ctry_k * FE_l + u$$

- Geography FE


- Nuts 1 composition: -5%
- Detailed region effect: -11%

- Industrial Sector FE

- Aggregated 1-d FE: -14%
- Detailed 4-d FE: -41%

- Establishment FE

- Yearly trend – 51%



2. Categories involved

- Model


$$Isol_{t10} = cat_t * year + cat_t * ctry_k + u$$

- Regions

- Segregation increases a little more within global financial center than outside GFC

- Sectors

- Sectors categorical trend
 - Finance & manufacturing: Top earners over-representation increases
 - Support service: Top earners under-representation which increases
- Within categorical trend
 - Stronger workplace trend within manufacturing, and also in transportation, and finance



3. Within workplace reorganization (1)

- Model

$$Isol_{t10_est} = org_change + est + year + u$$

- Size as within organization dimension

- Within workplace where workforce size drops, top earners isolation increases
- But : within workplace where size increases, top earners isolation decreases

	(1)	(2)
Establishment log size	-3.102 (0.07)	-2.824 (0.086)
Cumulative decrease in country log size		-0.569 (0.117)
Establishment FE	Yes	Yes
Year control	Yes	Yes

- Asymmetric causality effect

-10% size => +0.34 pp top10% isolation

+10% size => -0.28 pp top10% isolation


3b. Workplace restructuring processes involved. French details

- Outsourcing
 - DADS population data
 - 6+ worker flows from non-outsourced to an outsourced workplace (Goldschmidt and Schmieder 2017)
- Layoffs
 - MMO survey (2002-2014). Economic layoffs
 - All 50+ establishments
 - Sample 50-
- Offshoring
 - CAM 2012 survey on global value chain
 - Offshoring event between 2009 and 2011
 - Share of jobs destroyed
- Subcontracting
 - REPONSE survey 2005, 2011, 2017
 - 400 to 800 workplaces panelized
 - Activity subcontracted (Yes/No)
 - Share of activity subcontracted


Estimates (Intensity)

- Event study strategy
 - “Stacked version” for handling time heterogeneity bias (outsourcing & layoffs)
- Restructuring 10% of workforce / turnover
 - Outsourcing: +4% top 10% isolation (but very rare)
 - Layoffs: + 1.5 % (but more frequent)
 - Offshoring: +4%
 - Subcontracting: +4%
- Partly mediated by size reduction (blue triangle line)


Outsourcing (10% of workforce)




Offshoring (10% of workforce)



Layoffs (10% of workforce)



Subcontracting (10% of turnover)



● treated - no control ▲ treated - size control

4. Cross-country evidence

- Cross country regressions

$$Isol_{it10} = X\beta + ctry_k + year + u$$


- With country and year fixed effects
 - Variables country demeaned and standardized
 - Sequential introduction
- Advantage.
 - No spillover problem
 - Limits
 - Lack of precision
 - Capture correlated trends
 - Changes in field due to variable definition

- Independent variables:

- Deindustrialization: Workforce share in manufacturing energy (COIN)
 - Workplace shrinking : Average log size of workplace (COIN)
 - Shrinking asymmetry : Cumulative decrease in log size of workplace (COIN)
 - Globalization: FDI outward stock (UNCTADSTAT)
 - Global financial centers (Wage share - COIN)
 - Digitalization: ICT share of assets (EUKlems)
 - Financialization: Stock exchange volume (GFDD)
- Controls: log mean wage (OECD), log 20-64 population (OECD)

3 consistent factors

- Deindustrialization
 - 1 (within-country) *sd* decline in manufacturing employment
→ +0.37 to +0.43 *sd* in segregation (top 10% isolation)
- Workplace shrinking
 - 1 *sd* shrinking → + 0.2 *sd* segregation
- Digitalization
 - 1 *sd* ICT → + 0.15 to +0.3 *sd* segregation



Elements of discussion / prolongation

Segregation at work

Causes and consequences

Main take away

- Between workplace earnings segregation increases
 - In all countries
 - Happens mainly at the top
- Three key factors
 - Deindustrialization
 - Technological progress
 - Workplace restructuring (layoffs, offshoring, and outsourcing subcontracting)
 - (+ Financialization, but mostly for top 1% segregation)
- → Towards a research agenda on causes and consequences of workplace segregation


More on causes of segregation

- Need to improve research design
 - Causal sequential order of intertwined factors
 - Better handling of a distributional parameter
 - Causal identification and generality
- Future research: Declining worker power
 - Downsizing => shrink workers' rent produced by unions (Kramarz, 2017, Dekker and Koster 2018)
 - Workers resistance to downsizing Tomaskovic – Devey et al. (2020)

Investigating consequences of growing segregation

- 1. General decline in social mixing
 - Impact on geographical segregation
 - Increased opportunity hoarding at the top (Lin 2002) and declining social mobility (Davis and Mazumder 2020)
- 2. Elite isolation produces pro-inequality effects in return
 - Less exposure to normative claims from bottom. (Tomaskovic-Devey, Avent-Holt, 2019)
 - Increasing status competition among elite peers
 - More inequality?
- 3. A new conception of work and society and its political consequences
 - From class struggle/paternalist top-down relations
 - To class avoidance
 - Feeling of being left behind
 - Populism?

Social mobility and its evolution



Bernardi, F., Ballarino G., 2016, Education, Occupation and Social Origin, London, Edward Elgar

Intergenerational mobility in Germany (birth cohort 1960-72)

	DESTINATIONS							
ORIGINS	I	II-IIIa	IV	V	IIIb	VI	VII	
I: upper class	39	26	8	4	13	3	7	100
II-IIIa: skilled white collar	29	36	4	4	14	5	8	100
IV: petty bourgeoisie	11	16	10	1	17	16	29	100
V: technicians	20	22	9	7	13	13	16	100
IIIb: routine nonmanual	19	22	6	2	15	15	21	100
VI: skilled manual	8	18	4	1	17	25	27	100
VII: unskilled manual	9	13	5	4	15	15	39	100

Unequal & mobile: strong origins effects, high mobility, but long-run mobility is uncommon

Two thesis

- Constant Flux (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992)
- Increase in fluidity (Vallet, 1999, Breen, Mueller, 2020)

Figure 11.20: OD, OE and Simulation Trends, Men
















Figure 11.21: OD, OE and Simulation Trends, Women



Swiss men**US men****Italian men****Swedish men****Dutch men****Spanish men****Swiss women****US women****Italian women****Swedish women****Dutch women****Spanish women**