

Lecture 12.
The State
L'État

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The State

- Hobbes, [1651], *Leviathan*
 - A coercive power/monster to solve the war of all against all
- Hegel ([1820]) An engine to perform concrete universal (\neq law: abstract universal)
- Marx ([1844]), An expression and a tool of the dominant class to defend its interest
- “A state, is called the coldest of all cold monsters (...) ‘I, the state, am the people.’ It is a lie!” (Nietzsche, *Zarathoustra*, [1883/1885])


Multiple State forms

- Traditional States
 - City-States
 - Feudal/Royal States
 - Empires
- Modern States
 - National States (Ruling a contiguous territory)
 - Nation-States (Ruling homogeneous linguistic/cultural population)
 - Socialist States
- Difference in politics
 - Democracy and Authoritarian: Democracy recent, fragile and reversible

The Weberian definition → Force

- “we have to say that a State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”
- “il faut concevoir l’État contemporain comme une communauté humaine qui dans les limites d’un territoire déterminé revendique avec succès *le monopole de la violence physique légitime*.” (Weber, [1919])

Is this a State?



- West Bank after Oslo agreements

- Zone A (18%)

- Palestinian Authority responsible for security of goods & persons (but regular military interventions from Israel Army)

- Zone B (22%)

- Shared responsibility between PA & Israel

- Zone C (60%)

- Israel in charge

- Lack of territorial continuity + Lack of monopoly

● Settlements

Not just force. What does a State do?

(Tilly, 1992)

- War making – “eliminating or neutralizing their outside rivals”
- State making – “eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside their own territory”
- Protection – “eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients”
- Extraction – “acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities”
- Adjudication – “authoritative settlement of disputes among members of the population”
- Distribution – “intervention in the allocation of goods among the members of the population”
- Production – “control of the creation and transformation of goods and services produced by the population”

Outline

1. Before the modern State
 - Society without State
 - The organization of the Nuers as ordered anarchy
 - The patrimonial State
2. The birth of the modern State
 - The feudal fragmentation
 - The double fiscal/military monopoly
 - Police and Statistics as Sciences of government
 - Court Society and the courtization process
 - Towards Revolution: Royal power, Aristocracies and Bourgeoisie
3. Bureaucratic domination
 - Reminder on types of domination
 - The ideal-type of bureaucratic domination
 - Dysfunctional bureaucracies
 - Street-level bureaucrats
4. The transformation of the State
 - Welfare Regimes/States
 - New Public Management
 - Globalization and States' decline of power




Wikipedia: White House

A stateless society: the Nuer as ordered anarchy

(Evans-Pritchard, [1940])

- Semi-pastoral stateless society. Mobility with cattle during dry season
- Conflicting society: “Ordered anarchy”
 - Sources of conflicts=> cattle, land, adultery
 - Feud chains. [*Vengeance*]
 - Symbolic alignment of tribal section
 - If x from A11 is in conflict with y from B11 => conflict of A11 & B11
 - Sometimes mitigated by leopard-skin chief


Tribal splits. Helped by kinship relations in other villages (a fission somewhere is a fusion elsewhere)



Evans-Pritchard, [1940] A leopard-skin chief

Societies without &/or against the State

- Societies with or without State
 - Classical descriptive anthropological distinction
- Clastres, 1974. Societies against the State
 - Not lack-of. But deliberate refusal of a State/ coercion mechanism
 - In native American societies, the chief does not hold coercion power → must convince others through language
 - Obligation to redistribute
 - A coercive chief → killed, excluded, abandoned
 - Society as a whole exerts power → the society marks the body in initiation rituals
- Further assessment by anthropologists → coercion does exist in early societies but intensity, mechanisms and forms different from State society



Birth of States

- Traditional main stream view:
 - Emergence during Neolithic, with agriculture, storage, private property, water management, cities, and war.
 - But: Elements of State coercion detected before by archeologists
 - Neo Sumerian: Third Dynasty of Ur (-2112 to – 2004 BC) → First state with a bureaucracy, a legal system, etc.



Ur Nammu law code

Reminder on types of Weber's (1922) types of domination/authority/rule [Herrschaft]

- Domination: Chances for orders to be obeyed
- Three types of transversal form applied both to politics (State) & religion (Hierocracy)
 - Traditional domination
 - Based on “belief in the sanctity of long-established traditions and the legitimacy of those whose authority derives from these traditions”
 - Charismatic domination
 - Based on “the exceptional sanctity or heroic qualities or exemplary character of a person, and of the orders that this person proclaims or creates”
 - Legal domination with bureaucratic staff
 - Based on “a belief in the legality of statutory orders and the right of those appointed to exercise rule to give directions (legal rule)” (Weber, 1922)
- Applied to politics
 - Traditional domination
 - Patriarchalism
 - Gerontocracy
 - Patrimonialism
 - Feudal domination as a limit case, mostly patrimonial, but with charisma component
 - Charismatic domination
 - Bureaucracy

Patrimonial State

- Relation to other traditional dominations
 - Traditional domination without personal administrative staff → gerontocracy & patriachalism
 - With a personal administrative staff → Patrimonialism
- Patrimonial State : Authority rests on (arbitrary) personal power exercised by a royal family
 - Most extreme form: Sultanism
- State viewed as the personal patrimony of a family
 - Personal power.
 - Exchange: Personal loyalty against personal privilege
 - Delegation of authority through granting the office ownership [*propriété de la charge*].



Sultan Selim III © akg-images

From patrimonial to legal domination

- Weber's question?
 - How do we switch from traditional patrimonial or feudal domination to legal domination?
- Ex. Chinese Empire
 - First Empire to institute exams for civil servant (605 AD)
 - Element of legal bureaucratic rationality: avoids personal appropriation of offices
 - But content of exam disconnected with state skills
 - Limited role in transformation towards a rational-legal bureaucracy



Chinese Examination Cells at the South River School

The feudal fragmentation


- Merovingian & Carolingian fragile power dynamics
 - “Conquer and redistribute”
 - Redistribution of the Marchs to vassals in exchange of loyalty & military support
- Balance positive in extension phase
- But, in consolidation or reduction phase → land depletion
- Feudal dynamic: complex and split loyalties → fragmentation of power.
 - The King of France (resp. England): very little power.
 - Just one lord among many
 - Free competition phase (Elias, 1939)



Le Domaine royal à l'avènement d'Hugues Capet (987)

Progressive monopolization of power

LA FRANCE EN 1223
A LA MORT
DE PHILIPPE AUGUSTE




LE ROYAUME DE FRANCE DE CHARLES VIII A HENRI II 1483 - 1559

Les acquisitions


- 1532 = Bretagne incorporée au royaume (mariage de Anne de Bretagne avec Charles VIII puis Louis XII)
- 1552 = Les trois Evêchés (Metz, Toul et Verdun)
- 1558 = Calais et Boulogne

 Le domaine royal en 1559



The double monopolization

- What's a (modern) State ? (Elias, [1939])
 - A permanent army
 - A permanent taxation system
- Before the monopolization
 - War → raising an army and raising taxes
 - End of war → dissolution of army & ending of taxes
- Permanent army and taxation system appeared simultaneously in the 14th Century in France & England
 - Charles VII
 - 1439: A new permanent tax: the Taille
 - 1445: Compagnie d'ordonnance → permanent army



Court Society and the courtization of elites

- Tax + Army: Increase in the royal power
- Decrease in lords power → Rebellions against the King
 - War of religions (aristocratic dimension in the rebellion of many protestant princes)
 - The Fronde (1648-1653)
 - Local rebellions.
 - Gaston d'Orléans (brother of the Louis 13)
with Duc de Montmorency
- Court as way of monitoring the lords (Elias, [1969])
 - Nostalgia for independence & romanticization of peasant life
 - Success of the novel from d'Urfé, 1607/1627, *L'Astrée*



Court Society

(Elias, [1933/1969])

- Domestication of violence. Self control as the primary virtue of the courtesan, dissimulation.
 - Ban of duels
 - Etiquette. Good manners, table manners. Introduction of the fork. Limitation of the role of the knife
- Configuration with King at the center.
 - Distributes offices, privileges and pensions
- Aristocrats → sumptuary expenses to impress/please the king and gain access

Lever du Roi



Towards revolution: King, nobles and bourgeoisie

- Precarious equilibrium
- Main rivalries
 - Important princes versus King → domestication through court societies
 - Nobles of the Sword vs Nobles of the Robe
 - Bourgeoisie vs Nobles
 - Province versus Court
- King uses the divide and conquer. Leverage rivalry to increase absolute power
 - Failure of the Fronde → instability & failure of alliance between city bourgeoisie and aristocracy against King
 - Release of tension through partial inclusion in aristocracy → “charges annoblissantes”
- Evolution of the equilibrium
 - Growth Bourgeoisie + Nobility Reaction. King is not anymore the solution to growing tensions
 - French Revolution

Science of Government

- Governmentality (Foucault, 1978). Power and knowledge are not independent
- Police first seen as art of governing, not just force
- New types of knowledge: Statistics (Desrosières, 1993)
 - Statistics describing the State and its resources
 - Early statistics and surveys
 - Counting people (CENSUS) → military and fiscal purposes
 - Estimating income → fiscal statistics
- The state states
 - Not just normative (law)
 - But also epistemic authority: State / institutions “dit ce qu’il en est de ce qui est” (Boltanski, 2009).
Versus Critique: “les choses ne sont ce que l’on dit qu’elles sont”

The bureaucratic-legal domination

- An ideal-type → stylized traits, not always completely present
- A precise set of activities
- Governed by impersonal rules
- Based on written documents
- Obeying to rules
- Constituted of experts
 - Professional
 - Full time
 - Selection for their specific skills and knowledge
 - Organized in a hierarchy
 - Career (fixed salary, increasing with seniority, promotions, etc.)

Bureaucracy is impersonal

- “Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is appraised as its special virtue by capitalism. The more complicated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly objective expert, in lieu of the lord of older social structures who was moved by personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude. Bureaucracy offers the attitudes demanded by the external apparatus of modern culture in the most favorable combination.” (Weber, [1922])
- « *[La bureaucratie] développe d’autant plus complètement sa spécificité qu’elle se déshumanise – une évolution bienvenue pour le capitalisme – et réussit à cultiver la qualité singulière qui est prisée comme sa vertu, la capacité à évacuer l’amour, la haine et toutes les composantes émotionnelles et purement personnelles, irrationnelles par définition, qui échappent au calcul. A la place des maîtres des ordres anciens, qui se laissaient guider par la sympathie personnelle, la faveur, la grâce ou la la gratitude, la culture moderne exige que l’appareil extérieur sur lequel elle se fonde soit aux mains de spécialistes impartiaux d’un point de vue humain, et donc strictement “objectifs”, et cette exigence se renforce au fur et à mesure que la culture devient plus complexe et plus spécialisée. Or, la structure bureaucratique satisfait ces demandes de manière optimale » (Weber, [1922] 2013, p. 85)*

From rationality to dysfunctions.

- Weber, a little Hegelian. Bureaucracy as triumph of rationality
- Merton (1939): opposition between manifest and latent functions of bureaucracy.
 - Bureaucratic personality → Ritualism and strict application of rules
- Crozier (1963). *Bureaucratic phenomenon*
 - Incompleteness of rules → zones of uncertainty
 - Demand for new rules → new zones of uncertainty
 - Inflation in rules
 - Over determined bureaucratic worker:
 - form of power. Using its power to over comply or not to rules

Street level bureaucrats

- Street-level bureaucrats: “Public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work” (Lipsky, 1980, p.3)
- Criteria: public service; direct interaction between public workers and citizens/users; discretion
- “work as diverse and apparently unrelated as that of guidance counselors, judges, police officers, and social workers to a degree is structurally similar, so that one could compare these work settings with each other” (Lipsky, 2010, p. xii)

Why studying them?

- Street level bureaucrats have considerable impact on people's lives. This impact may be of several kinds. They socialize citizens to expectations of government services and a place in the political community. They determine the eligibility of citizens for government benefits and sanctions. They oversee the treatment (the service) citizens receive in those programs. Thus, in a sense street-level bureaucrats implicitly mediate aspects of the constitutional relationship of citizens to the state. In short, they hold the keys to a dimension of citizenship” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 4)
- Local implementation of public policies
- Citizens experience government
- Reflects of State transformations

Results

- Discretion: public policy in the books vs public policy in action / “highly scripted” work vs “improvisation and responsiveness to the individual case”
- Tension between individual treatment and “mass processing of clients”: context of individualization of social policy; structural constraints that press the agents towards mass-processing; lack of time, caseload...
- A different view on policymaking: the practices of SLBs are not a poor approximation of the intended policy, they are the policy. SLBs have a policymaking role, not just implementing. Need to focus on SLBs to fully understand a given policy.
- SLB Adaptation of a personal moral
 - “They develop conceptions of their work and of their clients that narrow the gap between their personal and work limitations”
- Citizens strategies and feelings obedience/resentment/hostility vis-à-vis SLB
 - Non-demand and non-take up

Examples

- How to distribute the 1998 emergency relief (Fassin 2001)
 - Calculation of a threshold according to the rules
 - Subjective evaluation of “merit”
 - Compassion for misfortune
- Expulsion or regularization of migrants (Spire 2008)
 - Low level female bureaucrats, trying to differentiate themselves from foreigners
 - 3 strategies
 - Motivated workers going beyond rules
 - Reluctant who just apply formally the rules, with no motivation and try not to discriminate migrants
 - Pragmatic who don't question rules, but switch from compassion to severity case by case
 - Strong discretionary power
 - Preference for easy cases

From regalian to welfare State

- Classical definition of state: (War and Force related / Law / Legitimacy / Bureaucracy (to some point)) → Regalian functions
- State have to manage more and more the social question
- Growth of the social / welfare State
 - (Leading to big increase in bureaucracy, social security being prototypical of paperwork bureaucracy)
 - Strong growth of welfare State in OECD countries
 - Very limited growth in the Global South

Figure 10.1

The rise of the Welfare State in European countries, 1870-2020





Figure 10.2a


Tax revenue and public spending on healthcare and education in Sub-Saharan Africa and South and South East Asia 1980-2018

Chancel et al., 2022, p. 168



Typologies of Welfare Regimes (States)

(Esping-Andersen, 1990)




- Based on weights of the family (reciprocity), the market, and the State (redistribution) in the organization of social life, especially in terms of care and education; with differences concerning the degree of inclusiveness of the welfare state
- Liberal regimes. Ex. USA
 - Residual risks. Conditionality. Favors and subsidize market solution
- Conservative regimes. Ex. Germany
 - Primacy of families and male bread-winners.
- Social democratic regimes. Ex. Sweden
 - Decommodification and universality and unconditionality of welfare.

The neoliberal turn

- From State as a solution (“*Trente Glorieuses*”)
 - State handles major social risks and problems: health, old age, family, poverty
 - State manages the economy.
 - Stop&Go policies, combining budgetary and monetary policies
 - A new stage of capitalism (State-Economy-Unions)
- To State as a problem
 - “Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem.” Reagan, 1981
 - Economic policies inefficient
 - Big government too costly → low growth
 - Bureaucracy inefficient

Figure 10.3 Progressive income tax rates across the world, 1900-2021

Chancel et al., 2022, p. 169



Interpretation: The graph shows the evolution of the top marginal income tax rate across various countries. **Sources and series:** wir2022. wid.world/methodology.

New public management

- On average, size of welfare State did not (substantially) decrease, but mostly stabilize
- Under strong austerity monitoring. Arbitrage between new needs to cover and domains that less covered
- New Public Management. An austerity technique oriented towards increasing efficiency/lowering cost of welfare
 - Mimicking market (competition, incentives, etc.)
 - Adapting new types of budget control
 - Transformation of State ministries in Agencies

Globalization and State's decline of power

- Rise of multilateral institutions:
 - UN, IMF, World Bank, OECD, G7, G20
 - Macro-regional institutions: EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR
- Decentralization forces
 - Regional secessionist tendencies; Catalonia, Scotland, etc.
- Globalized world
 - States can not address global problems
 - Global financial crisis, global warming,
 - Do not want to bare cooperation costs → Free rider solution

Ex. Polillo, Guillén 2005

- “Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence”
- What is the puzzle?

Puzzle: Globalization and the State

- Globalization → decrease of the State OR reconfiguration of the State
- Central Banking Independence as a good example to see link between globalization & State sovereignty
- Both approaches... globalization → State functions/role
- Alternative theories for central bank Independence?

Alternative theories

- Response to inflation
- Slow growth
- Political turnover
- Regime stability
- Fractionalization of politics

- Proposed Theory?

Theory basis

- World-system (Wallerstein, 1974)
 - International arena foster States
- World-society
 - Competition between States → Formal organization increase
- Neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
 - Isomorphic alignment: coercive, mimetic, normative

Hypotheses

- International Coercion
 - Hypothesis 1.—The greater the exposure to foreign trade, foreign investment, or multilateral lending, the more independent the central bank.
- Cross-National networks
 - Hypothesis 2.—The more a given country trades with other countries with an independent central bank, the more independent its own central bank because of normative pressure.
- Imitation of competitors
 - Hypothesis 3.—The more a country competes in trade against third countries with an independent central bank, the more independent its own central bank.
- DATA ?

DATA

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Central bank independence (CBI)47	.20	.14	.92
Trade openness ([imports + exports]/GDP) (TO)69	.49	.13	3.97
Inward FDI stock/GDP (IFDIS)16	.15	.00	.98
IMF lending/GDP (IMFL)01	.02	.00	.36
Cohesion in trade (CiT)42	.13	.15	.84
Role equivalence in trade (RET)	8.95	3.77	1.89	18.70
Elections (ELEC)27	.45	.00	2.00
Weighted conflict index (logged) (WCI)34	.63	.00	7.70
Checks and balances (C&B)	6.68	5.14	-8.00	10.00
Party fractionalization index (PFI)	6.40	2.04	.00	9.71
Government consumption/GDP (GC/GDP)16	.06	.03	.43
GDP per capita, current dollars (logged) (GDPpc)	8.52	1.53	4.44	10.74
Inflation rate (logged) (INF)	2.02	1.59	-4.09	8.92
Calendar year (YR)	1995.27	3.09	1990	2000
Probability of sample selection (PSS)62	.23	.03	.97
Adoption of CBI (event, .10 cutoff) (ACBI10)06	.24	.00	1.00
Adoption of CBI (event, .15 cutoff) (ACBI15)05	.22	.00	1.00
Adoption of CBI (event, .20 cutoff) (ACBI20)04	.20	.00	1.00

Logistic Results

- What should we read?

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Trade openness/GDP980* (.487)	.903 (.462)	1.046 (.543)	1.067 (.717)
Inward foreign direct investment/ GDP	-4.310 (2.375)	-4.005 (2.252)	-4.088 (2.231)	-3.704 (2.517)
IMF lending/GDP	10.460* (4.116)	8.486* (4.164)	10.802* (4.933)	12.975** (4.920)
Cohesion in trade	5.685** (2.035)	5.397** (2.015)	5.215* (2.307)	5.246 (2.850)
Role equivalence in trade169* (.078)	.180* (.080)	.243* (.096)	.281* (.125)
Elections236 (.345)	.231 (.341)	.259 (.345)	.309 (.393)
Weighted conflict index492* (.205)	.489* (.192)	.548* (.219)	.564* (.268)
Checks and balances085 (.069)	.014 (.100)	.013 (.111)	-.045 (.145)
Party fractionalization	-.102 (.126)	-.085 (.126)	.065 (.147)	.212 (.196)
Government consumption/ GDP	-6.066 (4.773)	-4.976 (4.714)	-7.500 (5.272)	-6.203 (5.468)
GDP per capita (logged)132 (.202)	-.377 (.513)	-.350 (.556)	-.260 (.659)
Inflation (logged)036 (.102)	.021 (.104)	-.043 (.112)	-.010 (.129)
Time since adoption369* (.176)	.402* (.203)	.342 (.189)	.327 (.211)
Central bank independence, $t - 1$	-4.531** (1.365)	-4.671** (1.343)	-5.237** (1.443)	-5.529** (1.706)
Calendar year	-.437* (.181)	-.463* (.207)	-.461* (.213)	-.511 (.261)
Probability of sample selection		3.983 (2.850)	4.220 (4.020)	4.935 (5.106)

Logistic Results

- H1
 - Trade openness/GDP
 - FDI
 - IMF
- H2
 - Cohesion in Trade
- H3
 - Role equivalence in Trade

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Logistic Results

- Sign and Significance
- Magnitude
 - Logistic models more difficult
 - Exponentiate coefficients
 - Standardization of variables
 - An increase of one standard deviation in IMF credit (0.02) leads to a 18.5% increase in the hazard of adoption of a statutory reform that makes the central bank more independent by 0.10 points in the Cukierman index ($100 * [\exp(8.486 * 0.02) - 1]$)

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Checks and balances085 (.069)	.014 (.100)	.013 (.111)	−.045 (.145)
Party fractionalization	−.102 (.126)	−.085 (.126)	.065 (.147)	.212 (.196)
Government consumption/ GDP	−6.066 (4.773)	−4.976 (4.714)	−7.500 (5.272)	−6.203 (5.468)
GDP per capita (logged)132 (.202)	−.377 (.513)	−.350 (.556)	−.260 (.659)
Inflation (logged)036 (.102)	.021 (.104)	−.043 (.112)	−.010 (.129)
Time since adoption369* (.176)	.402* (.203)	.342 (.189)	.327 (.211)
Central bank independence, <i>t</i> − 1	−4.531** (1.365)	−4.671** (1.343)	−5.237** (1.443)	−5.529** (1.706)
Calendar year	−.437* (.181)	−.463* (.207)	−.461* (.213)	−.511 (.261)
Probability of sample selection		3.983 (3.850)	4.220 (4.020)	4.935 (5.106)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Trade openness/GDP077** (.030)	.066* (.033)	.084* (.033)
Inward foreign direct investment/ GDP108* (.042)	.083 (.058)	.110* (.043)
IMF lending/GDP642* (.291)	.751** (.286)	.599* (.282)
Cohesion in trade305** (.098)		.308** (.099)
Role equivalence in trade016** (.003)		.016** (.003)
Elections006 (.009)	.005 (.009)	.006 (.009)
Weighted conflict index014 (.007)	.013 (.007)	.014 (.007)
Checks and balances	-.002 (.002)	-.004 (.006)	-.007 (.006)
Party fractionalization	-.006 (.003)	-.010* (.004)	-.006 (.004)
Government consumption/GDP002 (.203)	.168 (.227)	.125 (.183)
GDP per capita (logged)015 (.065)	.015 (.068)	-.002 (.058)
Inflation (logged)	-.004 (.003)	-.007** (.002)	-.005* (.003)
Calendar year	-.003 (.004)	.019** (.002)	-.002 (.004)
Probability of sample selection221 (.367)	.294 (.358)

OLS

- “An increase in trade openness of one standard deviation results in an increase equivalent to 1/5 of the standard deviation of central bank independence (0.084*0.49 = 0.04 or 1/5 of 0.20).”

Limit

- “Our results do not directly address the weakening of the state as a result of globalization, but rather its reconfiguration or reorganization along more technocratic lines that tend to benefit certain groups of policy makers and external constituencies”
- Not really tested

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